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Abstract 
The paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with 
an application to Vietnam rice exports. Firms can lobby for export restrictions or for free trade. 
Innovation is introduced as a cost-reducing technology. The analysis focuses on the 
innovation incentives of the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of 
lobbying incentives. The analysis shows that firms lobbying for export restrictions may have 
lower incentives to adopt technological innovations under export restrictions than under free 
trade. The findings can help to identify economic inefficiency when the political elites use 
export restrictions to seek rents. 
 
Keywords: Trade restrictions, export licenses, innovation, monopoly, rent seeking; free trade, 
economic development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During 2007-2008, the world experienced a food crisis that triggered export restrictions from 
the largest rice exporting countries, such as India and Vietnam (Slayton, 2009). The 
governments claimed that trade barriers were erected to protect their domestic consumers 
against price increases caused by the food crisis (Tsukada, 2011). There are counter-
arguments from food experts who have questioned the effectiveness of such drastic policies 
in insulating domestic markets against the fluctuations in the world market. First, export 
restrictions introduced in the middle of a price crisis might lead to expectations of further price 
increases. According to Thinh and Tran (2015), suppliers might postpone their current trading 
so that they can sell rice at higher prices in the future. On the other hand, consumers and 
traders might increase their current storage so that they can avoid buying rice at higher prices 
in the future.  
 
Such speculative behaviour is said to exacerbate the price increases that were observed during 
the imposition of export restrictions (see Tsukada, 2011, p. 70; Slayton, 2009, p. 10; Baylis, 
Jolejole-Foreman, and Mallory, 2014, p. 23). Consequently, further price surges allow 
governments to implement additional trade restrictions, thereby creating a vicious cycle 
(Fulton and Reynolds, 2015, p. 1216). While questioning the effectiveness of such policies to 
protect domestic consumers, Fulton and Reynolds (2015) draw attention to other possible 
motivations underlying trade restrictions. These authors argue that export restrictions are not 
only the responses of exporting countries that attempt to secure their national food security 
during food crises, but also a tool that can be used to maximize rents captured by their state-
owned enterprises. 
 
In Vietnam, trade restrictions have turned state-owned enterprises effectively into monopolists 
and monopsonists in the rice export market. On the one hand, export restrictions have 
prevented small producers and farmers from directly exporting their products to the world 
market, and increased the bargaining positions of large producers that are mostly state-owned 
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enterprises (Talbot and Nguyen, 2013, p. 12). On the other hand, exporting firms have to 
submit their export contracts to the Vietnam Food Administration (VFA), which is effectively 
a government organization, to request approval (Tsukada, 2011, p. 65). However, many 
generations of CEOs of Vinafood, a state-owned enterprise (SOE), are also simultaneously 
chairs of VFA (Slayton, 2009, p. 14). This creates an enormous conflict of interest as the SOEs 
can manipulate VFA to eliminate strong competitors, while the surviving firms risk disclosing 
their business information to Vinafood.  
 
In addition, even though farmers are the major stakeholders of the export restrictions, they 
have no role in the policy making process. Despite being the organization that is in charge of 
controlling rice exports, VFA only has representatives of state-owned enterprises, without any 
participation of the Farmers’ Union (Tran, Do, and Le, 2013, p. 36). During the export 
restrictions in 2008, the Vietnamese government still allowed the two largest SOEs to fulfill 
their commitments regarding government contracts to the Philippines (Slayton, 2009, p. 10). 
These two SOEs were not obliged to follow export bans, export quotas and minimum export 
prices (Slayton, 2009, p. 10-11; Baylis et al., 2014, p. 4-5). 
 
On the other hand, being almost the only firms that are permitted to export, these SOEs can 
use their market power to buy rice from farmers at depressed prices. It has been stated that 
farmers gained the least during the price peaks in 2008, while state-owned exporters captured 
all the benefits (Tran et al., 2013, p. 28). The difference between export prices and paddy rice 
prices reached their peak during the export ban period (Tran et al., 2013, p. 25), which 
certainly would seem to suggest that exporters used (or possibly abused) their monopsony 
power to reduce paddy rice prices. In this case, export restrictions were used as a transfer of 
profits from farmers and small rice companies to exporting firms.  
 
Similarly, Takacs (1994) shows that the government might use export controls on raw 
materials to support the processing industries that use the raw materials as inputs in their 
production process. In highly concentrated markets, large firms can exercise their monopsony 
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power against raw material producers (Takacs, 1994, p. 15). However, in spite of being vested 
with so many special and preferential treatments from the government, VFA and Vinafood 
are said to have paid little effort in terms of increasing the sector export quality.  
 
In the recent past, the main strategy of Vietnam rice exports was to focus on increasing export 
quantity without concern for quality. Rice production in Vietnam is often considered to be of 
low quality and value (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015; Tran, 2017). Rice that is produced in Vietnam 
often has a lower value (that is, price) than the same type of rice produced in Thailand (Nguyen 
and Dinh, 2015). A common practice of exporting firms is to auction for Government-to-
Government (G2G) contracts, and to export in large quantities. It is said that these G2G 
contracts comprise in excess of 70 per cent of total rice exports, and are mainly under the 
control of SOEs, who have captured around 70 per cent of total exports (Nguyen and Dinh, 
2015; Tran et al., 2013; Tran, 2017).  
 
Although the proportion has been decreasing in recent years, G2G contracts still comprise a 
significant amount of Vietnam rice exports. However, this strategy may contain substantial 
risks. The G2G contracts concentrate on some traditional markets, such as the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015; Tran, 2017). By focusing on only a few 
import countries, the total export quantity and value can easily be affected when there are 
fluctuations in demand from these import markets (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015). Moreover, these 
markets often do not require high quality in rice transactions. Therefore, exporters are often 
awarded G2G contracts on account of offering the lowest prices.  
 
This strategy may be profitable in the short run, but it has damaged the image of Vietnam rice 
exports as a low-quality product. Consequently, this strategy has become a precondition for 
these markets to continue lowering their bidding prices in future auctions. In addition, dealing 
rice contracts at low prices also means that exporting firms must buy paddy rice at depressed 
prices to sustain their profit margins. Therefore, selling rice of low quality may directly harm 
farmers’ incomes in the long run. 
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On the other hand, improving export quality has even greater significance when there is an 
increase in competition for G2G contracts from other large rice exporting countries, such as 
Thailand and India. In addition, large rice importing countries are improving their production 
capacities to sustain domestic demand (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015). This combination of 
activities will have a large impact on the incomes of farmers in the Vietnam rice industry if 
the sector continues to depend on these traditional markets, as has been the case in the past. 
Consequently, it is imperative that significant changes are made to the quality of rice exports 
from Vietnam.  
 
The increase in the proportion of high quality rice in total rice exports can help Vietnam 
penetrate higher value markets, such as Japan and Taiwan, and increase its competitiveness in 
traditional markets. This will also assist greatly in improving the living standards of farmers 
in Vietnam. However, the process of adopting new technologies and innovation incentives to 
improve rice quality has been rather slow, and has only received positive changes in recent 
years (Tran, 2017). The stagnation can be attributed to the dominance of VFA and state-owned 
enterprises in the rice export markets.  
 
On the basis of these serious concerns, the primary objective of this paper is to develop a 
model to explain why trade restrictions may result in a lack of innovation incentives to 
increase export quality. The lack of incentives arises from the rents that are provided to the 
SOEs that are not designed to present incentives to exporting firms to increase their adoption 
of innovations. Moreover, the model also explains why trade restrictions can be inefficient, 
and remain in place for an extended period. 
 
In the literature regarding the effects of Vietnam export bans, there are only a few that have 
been concerned about the impacts of such trade policies on the long term development of the 
rice sector in Vietnam. This paper intends to contribute to the literature by explaining a 
7 
mechanism whereby a redistribution from farmers to SOEs that are caused by export 
restrictions may impede the sector’s long term development. 
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. A literature review is presented in Section 2. The 
model specification involving the framework, free trade, trade restrictions, comparisons, and 
incentives for lobbying, are discussed in Section 3. Some concluding remarks are given in 
Section 4. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
This paper is closely connected to the literature on the relationship between rent seeking, trade 
restrictions, monopolies, and economic efficiency. Traditionally, the costs of monopolies and 
trade restrictions, such as import tariffs to society, are distortions caused by the reduction in 
the quantity consumed arising from price increases. Such price increases not only transfer the 
surplus from consumers to producers and the government budget, but also creates deadweight 
losses for social welfare (Posner, 1975; Krueger, 1974).  
 
Tullock (1967) argues that the social costs of monopolies and trade restrictions may exceed 
the costs caused by the deadweight loss. The main argument is that, in order to obtain those 
rights, firms have to invest in lobbying and rent seeking, which costs real resources and are 
considered wasteful to society. Tullock (1967, pp. 228-231) describes rent seeking as a form 
of theft. Burglars invest in lock picking technologies in order to steal from their victims, while 
the victims also invest in technologies that are intended to prevent burglars from stealing. 
Such activities are considered wasteful to society as the resources that are used in the process 
could have been used for alternative more productive purposes.  
 
Krueger (1974) highlights an example in which rent seeking does not produce any socially 
valuable by-products. For example, the government may allocate import licenses based on 
firms’ capacities. In this case, firms are willing to expand their plants even under excess 
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capacity to obtain import rights. Therefore, the investments have no productive purpose apart 
from winning the import licenses. This example is closely related to regulations that prevent 
firms from applying for export licenses in Vietnam. The regulation requires the rice exporting 
firms to have a “minimum capacity of 5,000 tons” and milling facilities with a “minimum 
capacity of 10 tons per hour” (Talbot and Nguyen, 2013, p. 12).  
 
Consequently, firms will have incentives to expand their capacity to receive export rights, 
even though they may not use their full capacity. A traditional strand of rent seeking literature, 
often inspired by the seminal works of Posner (1975) and Krueger (1974), focuses on 
estimating the resources wasted in the rent seeking contest, while ignoring the actual impact 
of the policies resulting from rent seeking on economic development. Addressing this concern, 
the paper analyzes the impacts of export restrictions on a real economic variable, such as the 
level of innovation. In particular, the paper presents a rent seeking model in which export 
restrictions can alter the nature of the economic market structure, and directly affect the 
innovation incentives of the economic players. 
 
The relationship between rent seeking and economic efficiency has been discussed 
extensively in the literature. The traditional political economy models often consider rent 
seeking as a trade-off between the consumer and producer surpluses: incumbent firms and 
new entrant benefits; trade restrictions and liberalizations (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; 
Hillman, 1984; Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975). Such an approach has left an impression that 
there are unresolved conflicts between rent seeking and economic efficiency, which states that 
rent seeking often leads to inefficient policy outcomes, such as import tariffs and monopolies, 
where such policies may not disappear while such interest groups are still in power.  
 
However, Rodrik (2014) offers a different perspective on this matter. Instead of trying to 
eliminate trade restrictions and protectionism, which are often considered the causes of 
economic inefficiency, but are heavily protected by powerful interest groups, the analysis 
argues that governments need to find innovative policies and political innovations that can 
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bypass such efficiency without jeopardizing the political and economic shares of these groups. 
In that way, policy changes are more feasible as there would be less resistance from the 
lobbying groups. 
 
Regarding the economic efficiency of rent seeking, Khan and Jomo (2000, pp. 40-53) argue 
that, even though the rent seeking process may waste real resources as rent seekers compete 
for rent, its net effect may still be positive to society if the resulting policy outcomes create 
value for society. Such value may arise from Schumpeterian rents or rents for learning that 
create incentives for firms to adopt and invent new technologies. On the other hand, rent 
seeking may be even more detrimental to social welfare if it reduces innovation incentives, 
which is harmful to growth and development.  
 
These concerns justify the need to analyze the potential inefficiency of providing rents to 
exporting firms in the form of trade restrictions. Whether one believes such policy options 
may exist or not, it is important to locate the sources of inefficiency that are caused by the 
policies arising from rent seeking. Moreover, the findings can help to justify the need to 
eliminate trade restrictions and protectionism. Such findings might also be able to contribute 
to the creation of more innovative solutions that can coordinate economic efficiency and 
interest groups. 
 
The literature on the relationship between market structure and innovation may shed light on 
the impact of rent seeking on innovation incentives. According to Brou and Ruta (2013), firms 
lobbying for subsidies and tax cuts can alter the market structure by influencing the 
equilibrium number of firms in the economic market and, therefore, the level of innovation. 
As an alternative, Arrow (1962) argues that the innovation incentives under monopoly are 
lower than under competition.  
 
Demsetz (1969) notes that the analysis in Arrow (1962) makes an implicit assumption that the 
monopolist restricts quantity compared with the total quantity under competition. Intuitively, 
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the greater the output a firm produces, the more it can use the newly adopted marginal cost 
reducing or quality improving technologies. Such an outcome would justify the lower 
innovation incentives under monopoly as compared with under competition.  
 
However, Holmes, Levine, and Schmitz (2012, p. 12) argue that a reduction in monopoly 
power does not always increase the level of production. The increase in competition caused 
by tariff reductions may eliminate some domestic firms and replace them with foreign firms, 
which reduces domestic output and, consequently, the innovation incentives. This paper 
contributes another channel whereby trade restrictions can lower the monopolist’s production 
and, therefore, their innovation incentives. The reduction in production is caused by the 
replacement effect, in which the monopolist purchases rice from other producers and then re-
sells the rice to the world market rather than producing and exporting rice themselves. 
 
With regard to the causal relationship between innovation and rent seeking, Lenway, Morck, 
and Yeung (1996) argue that firms are more likely to lobby for trade restrictions when they 
are less efficient and have a lower return on investment. These lobbying firms are less likely 
to spend on research and development, which suggests that less innovative firms are more 
badly affected by free trade and have greater incentives to lobby for trade barriers (Lenway et 
al., 1996, pp. 412-415).  
 
Alternatively, the correlation can mean that firms in a more protected industry may have less 
incentive to be innovative. From the analysis in the next section, it is shown that a causal 
relationship between innovation and rent seeking can be interpreted in different ways. A less 
efficient firm may find it beneficial to lobby for trade restrictions, while a highly protected 
firm might find it optimal to reduce innovations under trade restrictions. 
 
3. Model Specification 
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a. Framework 
 
Consider an economy where N firms in the domestic market produce rice and export to the 
world market. The export volume of the domestic country is large enough to influence the 
world price. As the world’s second largest rice exporters in quantity, this assumption is 
entirely appropriate for Vietnam. Therefore, the demand function can be simply represented 
as 𝑃 = 1 − 𝑄 
 
The quality of rice is assumed to be homogeneous. All firms have convex cost functions. Firm 
1 can reduce its marginal cost by investing in cost reducing technologies. Alternatively, firms 
can compete in a market with differentiated goods, and adoption of innovations can lead to an 
increase in the quality of rice, which increases mark-ups and profits. For simplicity, this model 
focuses on homogeneous products and cost reducing innovations. 
 
Suppose that firm 1 is different from other firms in terms of production costs and lobbying 
costs, while firms 2, 3, ..., N are identical. In the case of Vietnam, firm 1 represents a group 
of state-owned enterprises that are given exclusive rights to export rice. On the other hand, 
firms 2, 3, ..., N represent smaller firms and farmers with small market power and low capacity 
to invest in technological improvements. This explains why their innovation incentives are 
constant in the model. 
 
Moreover, firm 1 can be different from firms 2, 3, ..., , N  in terms of their lobbying capacity. 
The assumption that firms can have different “lobbying technologies” reflects the reality that 
some firms, being state-owned enterprises, are closely connected to the government, and are 
thereby more effective in the lobbying process. On the other hand, firms 2, 3, ..., N are small 
rice producers and farmers without strong connections to the state, and thereby do not have 
any material effect on export policies. Firm 1 lobbies for trade restrictions to become the only 
firm allowed to export, while the other firms lobby for free trade so that they can export freely 
to the world market.  
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The model focuses on analyzing firm 1’s innovation and lobbying incentives. First, the model 
analyzes the direct effects of trade restriction on firm 1’s innovation incentives, given that the 
innovation levels of all other firms remain constant. Second, the paper investigates the firms’ 
lobbying incentives. In particular, the analysis focuses on explaining how firm 1’s winning 
probability in the lobbying contest depends on its production efficiency relative to the other 
firms. 
 
In this model, firms compete in two markets, namely the political and economic markets. In 
the political market, firms invest in lobbying activities to decide whether trade restriction are 
implemented. In the economic market, firms decide the optimal level of quantities, and firm 
1 decides its innovation level under the market structure that is decided in th political market.  
 
The order of the game is as follows:  
 
Stage 1: Firm 1 lobbies for trade restrictions, while firm 2, ..., N lobbies for free trade. At the 
end of the rent seeking process, the trade regime is decided, and its outcome is observed by 
all firms. 
 
Stage 2: Firm 1 decides how much to invest in cost reducing technologies. After the decision 
is made, all firms observe the cost structures of their competitors.  
 
Stage 3: The firms decide their quantities, given the trade regime and each other’s cost 
functions. 
 
There are two possible market structures, namely free trade and trade restrictions. The game 
is solved via backward induction. The model starts to solve the equilibrium profits under the 
two scenarios, then the analysis compares the innovation incentives under both free trade and 
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trade restrictions. Subsequently, the lobbying efforts of the firms are analyzed in the lobbying 
contests, given their profits under both free trade and trade restrictions. 
 
 
b. Free trade 
 
Under free trade, every firm is allowed to export to the world market without any restrictions. 
Firms engage in Cournot competition, with the inverse demand function, 𝑃 = 1 − 𝑄. The 
firms’ profit functions are:  
 
 𝜋ଵி் = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞ଵ − (1 − 𝑎)𝑘𝑞ଵଶ −
ఈ
ଶ
𝑎ଶ (1) 
 
 𝜋௜ி் = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞௜ −
ଵ
ଶ
𝑞௜ଶ,        with 𝑖 = 2, 3, . . . , 𝑁. (2) 
  
Each firm’s revenue equals price times quantity. Each firm has a convex cost function, where 
k is firm 1’s production efficiency parameter, and firm i’s parameter is 0.5.  A larger k implies 
that firm 1 is more inefficient in production than other firms. Firm 1 can invest in cost reducing 
technologies, a, to reduce the marginal production costs: a must lie between 0 and 1, so that 
the marginal production costs remain positive. Innovation incurs a cost of  
ఈ
ଶ
𝑎ଶ.  
 
The first-order condition (FOC) is used to determine the optimal quantities under free trade, 
that is, 𝑞ଵி் and 𝑞௜ி்:  
 
 𝑞ଵ =
ଶ
ଶ(ଵି௔)௞(ேାଵ)ାேାଷ
 (3) 
 
 𝑞௜ =
ଶ(ଵି௔)௞ାଵ
ଶ(ଵି௔)௞(ேାଵ)ାேାଷ
,        with 𝑖 = 2, 3, . . . , 𝑁. (4) 
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Taking into account that 𝑞ଵ and 𝑞௜ are to be chosen optimally, it is possible to determine the 
marginal effect of a change in the innovation term, a, on firm 1’s equilibrium profit under free 
trade (see Appendix A.1):  
 
     
  ௗగభ
ಷ೅
ௗ௔
= ସ௞ൣଶ൫ଵି௔
ಷ೅൯௞(ேାଵ)ାଷேାଵ൧
[ଶ(ଵି௔ಷ೅)௞(ேାଵ)ାேାଷ]య
−  𝛼𝑎ி்   (5) 
 
 
c. Trade Restrictions 
 
Under trade restrictions, only firm 1 is allowed to export, while the other firms cannot export 
directly to the world market. In order to export, firms 2, ..., N have to become firm 1’s 
suppliers. Suppose that the number of firms N is large such that, using its bargaining power, 
firm 1 can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other firms. Firms 2, ..., N can either accept 
or reject the offer, but they cannot bargain to change the design of the offer are there are many 
unco-ordinated firms. The offer can have a form of a pair 𝑞௝ and 𝑡௝  : 𝑞௝ is the quantity that 
firm 1 demands and 𝑡௝  is the transfer payment to firm j. As firm 1 has the power to set the 
offer, they have no incentive to give firms 2, ..., N  more favourable terms. However, the offer 
must be designed so that firms 2, ..., N would be willing to accept the offer if their profits are 
positive.  
 
Assuming that firm 1 has full information about the cost structures of firms 2, ..., N, the 
transfers from firm 1 to the other firms will be sufficient to cover their costs and to incentivize 
acceptance of the offer. Consequently, the profit functions of firm 1 and firm i under trade 
restrictions are:   
 
𝜋ଵ்ோ = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞ଵ − (1 − 𝑎)𝑘𝑞ଵଶ −
ఈ
ଶ
𝑎ଵଶ + (1 − 𝑄) ∑ே௜ୀଶ 𝑞௜ −
ଵ
ଶ
∑ே௜ୀଶ 𝑞௜ଶ (6) 
 
𝜋௜்ோ = 0. (7) 
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As the other firms have convex cost functions, the more firm 1 buys from one particular firm, 
the more costly does it become. In addition, the other firms are identical so that, in order to 
minimize the buying prices, the best strategy for firm 1 is to buy the same quantities from 
every firm i.  
 
Firm 1’s profit function becomes:  
 
𝜋ଵ்ோ = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞ଵ − (1 − 𝑎)𝑘𝑞ଵଶ −
ఈ
ଶ
𝑎ଶ + (1 − 𝑄)(𝑁 − 1)𝑞௜ −
ଵ
ଶ(ேିଵ)௤೔
మ . (8) 
  
The first-order condition to determine the optimal 𝑞ଵ and 𝑞௜ are:  
 
 𝑞ଵ =
ଵ
ଶ
ଵ
ଵା(ଵି௔)௞(ଶேିଵ)
 (9) 
 
 𝑞௜ =
(ଵି௔)௞
ଵା(ଵି௔)௞(ଶேିଵ)
  (10) 
 
 Taking into account that 𝑞ଵ  and 𝑞௜  are chosen optimally, it is possible to determine the 
marginal effect of a change in a on firm 1’s equilibrium profits under trade restrictions (see 
Appendix A.2): 
  
           ௗగభ
೅ೃ
ௗ௔
=
భ
ర௞
[ଵା(ଵି௔)௞(ଶேିଵ)]మ
− 𝛼𝑎  (11) 
 
 
d. Comparison 
 
When k is sufficiently large, firm 1’s production under trade restrictions is lower than under 
free trade.  This section will illustrate the changes in firm 1’s behaviour under trade restrictions 
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as compared with under free trade. The changes will affect firm 1’s innovation incentives 
under trade restrictions. Under free trade, there is a strategic effect, where firm 1 can reduce 
the quantities of the other firms by reducing its marginal costs through investing in technology 
and innovation:  
 
𝑞௜ =
2(1 − 𝑎)𝑘 + 1
2(1 − 𝑎)𝑘(𝑁 + 1) + 𝑁 + 3
 
 
Consequently, the prices increase and firm 1 has an incentive to expand is production due to 
having lower marginal costs. Therefore, firm 1 has strong incentives to invest in technologies 
to reduce marginal costs. However, such strategic effect disappears under trade restrictions as 
firm 1 effectivelybecomes a monopoly in the export market. The strategic effect is replaced 
by the monopoly effect and the replacement effect. On the one hand, being a monopoly makes 
firm 1 restrict the total export quantity.  
 
As the result, the monopoly effect reduces the total export quantiity, so that  𝑄்ோ < 𝑄ி்  
(see Appendix A.3). Under a restricted total export quantity, firm 1 has to choose the most 
efficient combination between self-production and purchasing from other firms, which can 
lead to a lower or higher 𝑞ଵ under trade restrictions than under free trade. It is useful to 
consider the optimal quantities 𝑞ଵ்ோ  and 𝑞௜்ோ  from equations (9) and (10), respectively, 
without the innovation term:  
 
 𝑞ଵ =
ଵ
ଶ
ଵ
ଵା௞(ଶேିଵ)
 
 
 𝑞௜ =
௞
ଵା௞(ଶேିଵ)
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so that  
ப௤భ
ப௞
< 0  and  ப௤೔
ப௞
> 0. This means that if firm 1 is efficient, it may prefer producing 
itself to buying from other firms under trade restriction. On the other hand, if firm 1 is 
inefficient, it will reduce its own production and increase the quantities bought from other 
firms. The replacement effect happens when firm 1 becomes sufficiently inefficient, so that  
𝑞ଵ்ோ < 𝑞ଵி் (see Appendix A.4).   
 
When  𝑞ଵ்ோ < 𝑞ଵி், firm 1’s innovation incentives under trade restrictions is lower than under 
free trade. Intuitively, innovation becomes more valuable when it can be applied to a larger 
quantity. This effect can be shown by comparing the total costs of firm 1 with and without the 
innovation term, a: 
 
Total costs (with a) = (1 − 𝑎)𝑘𝑞ଶ ; 
 
Total costs (without a) = 𝑘𝑞ଶ ; 
 
∆Total costs = 𝑎𝑘𝑞ଶ.  
 
The total costs saved is dependent on the total quantity. Therefore, a lower quantity may 
weaken firm 1’s innovation incentives under trade restrictions. It might be conjectured that 
when 𝑞ଵ்ோ < 𝑞ଵி், it is likely that the innovation level under trade restrictions is lower than 
under free trade.  
 
In order to confirm this intuition, consider again the marginal effect of a change in the 
innovation term, a, on firm 1’s equilibrium profits under free trade and under trade restrictions, 
taking into account that 𝑞ଵ and 𝑞௜ are chosen optimally under each scenario:  
  
𝑑𝜋ଵி்
𝑑𝑎
=
4𝑘[2(1 − 𝑎ி்)𝑘(𝑁 + 1) + 3𝑁 + 1]
[2(1 − 𝑎ி்)𝑘(𝑁 + 1) + 𝑁 + 3]ଷ
− 𝛼𝑎ி் 
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𝑑𝜋ଵ்ோ
𝑑𝑎
=
𝑘
4 [1 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑘(2𝑁 − 1)]ଶ
− 𝛼𝑎 
 
Simplifying the above functions using the optimal quantities 𝑞ଵி் and 𝑞ଵ்ோ  from equations (3) 
and (9) leads to:  
 
 
ௗగభಷ೅
ௗ௔
= 𝑘[2(1 − 𝑎)𝑘(𝑁 + 1) + 3𝑁 + 1](𝑞ଵி்)ଶ − 𝛼𝑎 (12) 
 
 
ௗగభ೅ೃ
ௗ௔
= 𝑘(𝑞ଵ்ோ)ଶ − 𝛼𝑎. (13) 
  
Therefore, the innovation incentive under free trade is higher than under trade restrictions 
when firm 1’s optimal quantity under free trade is greater than under trade restrictions. On the 
other hand, firm 1 may have a greater incentive to innovate under trade restrictions than under 
free trade when its optimal quantity under trade restrictions is, in fact, greater than under free 
trade. 
 
e. Rent Seeking Model 
 
This is the state in which firms lobby for their favourable market structure based on their 
expected payoff and lobbying cost functions. The analysis assumes that the probability that 
firm 1 wins the rent seeking contest equals the proportion of firm 1’s lobbying effort in the 
total rent seeking efforts, called 𝑃ଵ. This is also the probability that export restrictions are 
realized. On the other hand, other firms can lobby against trade restrictions by increasing the 
total rent seeking efforts to dilute firm 1’s probability of winning.  
 
The probability that free trade is realized, therefore, equals 1 − 𝑃ଵ . Their lobbying costs 
increase with their rent seeking efforts. Firms may have different lobbying cost functions, and 
it is assumed that firm 1 is the only firm that can lobby for trade restrictions: 
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 𝑉ଵ =
௫భ
௫భା∑ಿ೔సమ ௫೔
𝜋ଵ்ோ + ൬1 −
௫భ
௫భା∑ಿ೔సమ ௫೔
൰ 𝜋ଵி் − 𝑘௟𝑥ଵ (14) 
 
 𝑉ଶ = ൬1 −
௫భ
௫భା∑ಿ೔సమ ௫೔
൰ 𝜋௜ி் − 𝑚௟𝑥௜  (15) 
  
 𝑃ଵ =
௫భ
௫భା∑ಿ೔సమ ௫೔
 (16) 
 
Firm 1 may be more well connected to the government than are the other firms, which makes 
it more efficient in the lobbying contest for export restrictions, where 𝑘௟ and 𝑚௟  denote firm 
1’s and firm i’s lobbying efficiency parameters, respectively. Firm 1’s payoff function, 𝑉ଵ 
equals the sum of its expected profit under trade restrictions and its expected profit under free 
trade, minus its lobbying costs. Similarly, firm i’s payoff function, 𝑉ଶ, equals its expected 
profit under free trade minus its lobbying costs.  
 
The FOCs of the expected payoffs with respect to 𝑥ଵ and 𝑥௜  are:  
 
 
(గభ೅ೃିగభಷ೅) ∑ಿ೔సమ ௫೔
(௫భା∑ಿ೔సమ ௫೔)మ
− 𝑘௟ = 0 (17) 
 
 
గ೔
ಷ೅௫భ
(௫భା∑ಿ೔సమ ௫೔)మ
− 𝑚௟ = 0 (18) 
 
 
From the above functions, it can be shown that a firms’ willingness to increase their lobbying 
efforts is proportional to their gains from lobbying. For firm 1, its gain from lobbying is the 
difference between its profit under trade restrictions and under free trade. For firm i, their 
gains from lobbying are their profits under free trade. Moreover, if firm 1 is more efficient in 
lobbying, which means that k is small, then it is more willing to invest in the lobbying contest:  
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௫భ
∑ಿ೔సమ ௫೔
= ௠
௞
൬గభ
೅ೃିగభಷ೅
గ೔
ಷ೅ ൰  (19) 
 
Firm 1’s probability of winning the rent seeking contest can be determined using the above 
equation:   
     
𝑃 = ௫భ
௫భା∑ ௫೔ಿ೔సమ
= ௠೗൫గభ
೅ೃିగభಷ೅൯
௞೗గ೔
ಷ೅ା௠೗൫గభ೅ೃିగభಷ೅൯
   (20) 
 
 
f. Incentives for Lobbying 
 
This section demonstrates how firm 1’s relative efficiency in production as compared with the 
other firms can change their gains from lobbying, as well as their incentives to lobby. Consider 
the following more simplified profit functions under free trade and trade restrictions:  
  
𝜋ଵி் = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଵଶ (21) 
  
𝜋௜ி் = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞௜ − 𝑚௣𝑞௜ଶ (22) 
  
𝜋_1^𝑇𝑅 = (1 − 𝑄) 𝑞_1 − 𝑞_1^2 + (1 − 𝑄)(𝑁 − 1) 𝑞_𝑖 − 𝑚_𝑝 (𝑁 − 1) 𝑞_𝑖^2  (23) 
 
In order to simplify the analysis, the innovation term is considered fixed and firm 1’s 
production efficiency parameter is normalized to 1, while 𝑚௣  is treated as the relative 
efficiency of other firms as compared with firm 1.  
 
The purpose of the analysis is to understand what would happen to firm 1’s probability of 
winning when the other firms become more efficient as compared with firm 1. 
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After solving for the optimal outputs 𝑞ଵ  and 𝑞௜  in each case (see Appendix A.5), the 
equilibrium profit functions become:  
 
 𝜋ଵி் = 2 ൬
ଶ௠೛ାଵ
ଷேା଼௠೛ାଵ
൰
ଶ
 (24) 
 
 𝜋௜ி் = (𝑚௣ + 1) ൬
ଷ
ଷேା଼௠೛ାଵ
൰
ଶ
 (25) 
 
 𝜋ଵ்ோ =
௠೛ାேିଵ
ସ(ଶ௠೛ାேିଵ)
 (26) 
 
If 𝑁 > ଼௠೛ାଵହ
ଷ
, the probability that firm 1 wins the lobbying contest decreases with 𝑚௣. 
From equation (20), it is possible to determine the marginal effect of a change in 𝑚௣ on firm 
1’s winning probability:  
 
 
ப௉
ப௠೛
= 𝑧 ൤𝜋௜ி்
ப൫గభ೅ೃିగభಷ೅൯
ப௠೛
− (𝜋ଵ்ோ − 𝜋ଵி்)
பగ೔
ಷ೅
ப௠೛
൨ (27) 
 
 𝑧 = ௠೗௞೗
ൣ௞೗గ೔
ಷ೅ା௠೗൫గభ೅ೃିగభಷ೅൯൧
మ (28) 
 
 
It can be seen that the marginal effect of a change in firm 1’s relative efficiency on the 
probability of winning depends on two terms: 
ఋ൫గభ೅ೃିగభಷ೅൯
ఋ௠೛
  and  ఋగ೔
ಷ೅
ఋ௠೛
. The first term is the 
marginal effect of a change in 𝑚௣  on firm 1’s gains from lobbying. Firm 1’s gains from 
lobbying are the difference between its profits under trade restrictions and free trade. Under 
free trade, firm 1 has to compete with firms 2, ..., N in Cournot competition.  
 
The more efficient is firm i, the more competitive does the market become, which has a 
negative effect on firm 1’s profits. Therefore, firm 1’s free trade profit is negatively affected 
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by a decrease of 𝑚௣. This can be shown by considering the marginal effect of a change in 
𝑚௣ on firm 1’s profit under free trade:  
 
∂𝜋ଵி்
∂𝑚௣
= 4 ቆ
2𝑚 + 1
3𝑁 + 8𝑚௣ + 1
ቇ
6(𝑁 − 1)
(3𝑁 + 8𝑚௣ + 1)ଷ
> 0 
 
However, under trade restrictions, the more efficient firm i can supply firm 1 with cheaper 
inputs. Therefore, the profit of firm 1 under trade restrictions is positively affected by a 
decrease in 𝑚௣. This can be shown by considering the marginal effect of a change in 𝑚௣ on 
firm 1’s profit under trade restrictions:  
 
                பగభ
೅ೃ
ப௠೛
= ି(ேିଵ)
ସ(ଶ௠೛ାேିଵ
< 0. 
 
 
Therefore, firm 1’s gains from lobbying will increase when other firms become relatively 
more efficient, which makes the first term negative:  
 
                               ப൫గభ
೅ೃିగభಷ೅൯
ப௠೛
< 0.  (29) 
  
Consider the marginal effect of a change in 𝑚௣ on firm i’s free trade profits:  
 
∂𝜋௜ி்
∂𝑚௣
=
9(3𝑁 − 8𝑚௣ − 15)
(3𝑁 + 8𝑚௣ + 1)ଷ
 
 
 
If 𝑁 > ଼௠೛ାଵହ
ଷ
, then  பగ೔
ಷ೅
ப௠೛
> 0. This means that, when there are too many firms in the 
export market, reducing 𝑚௣ may lead to an increase in competition, which decreases firm i’s 
equilibrium profits. Therefore, when N is sufficiently large, the following inequality holds:  
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𝜋௜ி்
∂(𝜋ଵ்ோ − 𝜋ଵி்)
∂𝑚௣
− (𝜋ଵ்ோ − 𝜋ଵி்)
∂𝜋௜ி்
∂𝑚௣
> 0 
 
The analysis demonstrates the fact that firm 1 may feel threatened by the entry of relatively 
more efficient firms. Consequently, the threat forces firm 1 to try to influence the government. 
By participating in the rent seeking contest, firm 1 can lobby for trade restrictions in order to 
neutralize the harmful effects of the entering firms on its profits.  
 
Under trade restrictions, firm 1 can avoid direct competition with other firms, and turn them 
into its suppliers. Thus, firm 1 will have greater incentives to lobby for trade restrictions when 
there are more firms with greater efficiency that enter the export market. Consequently, firm 
1 will have a higher probability of winning the rent seeking contest, and trade restrictions are 
more likely to be realized. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The market structure under trade restrictions has changed exporter behaviour in a unique way. 
Based on the findings of the paper, if exporters are very efficient, they are more likely to 
expand their production under trade restriction as compared with that under free trade. The 
increased production will increase the innovation incentives of exporters under trade 
restrictions. On the other hand, trade restrictions have increased exporter bargaining power, 
so that there is a reduction in the input prices that exporters pay to other producers.  
 
Therefore, an inefficient exporter would choose to buy rice from other firms and re-sell on the 
world market instead of producing rice themselves. Consequently, a low production level will 
reduce innovation incentives because the value of innovation is dependent on the level of 
production. On the other hand, inefficient exporters are more likely to be hurt by competition 
with efficient firms under free trade. Moreover, being able to buy inputs of rice at cheap prices 
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is more valuable to these firms as compared with more efficient firms. Consequently, these 
inefficient firms are more likely to lobby for trade restrictions. 
 
For a long time, Vinafood companies have held a dominant role in the rice export market, with 
around 40-50 per cent of the total export quantity. On the other hand, their profits are heavily 
dependent on G2G contracts, which are often exported in large quantities. It is said that around 
50 per cent of Vinafoods exports are from G2G contracts (Tran et al., 2013). However, these 
firms do not grow their own rice to fulfill their contracts. Instead, they depend on the rice 
supply collected from farmers and other producers. The nature of their business model, which 
is based on trading rice in the export market rather than producing rice, explains why these 
exporters are reluctant to invest in technologies and innovations to increase export quality. On 
the other hand, the SOEs often win the auctions for these contracts by offering the lowest 
prices.  
 
Moreover, the same SOEs often collect rice from merchants and intermediaries immediately 
after winning the auction, without preparing their own supply sources in advance. Thus, the 
only choice for them is to buy rice as inputs at spot prices. From the rent seeking perspective, 
these firms are likely to lobby for export restriction from the time the auctions start until the 
designated delivery date. The first reason is to reduce potential competitors who might 
undercut them in the auctions; second, the exporters can collect rice from the spot market at 
lower prices. 
 
Even though the export restrictions may have caused some inefficiencies, a complete 
liberalization of the rice export market is unlikely to occur immediately, especially in view of 
the rents received by the political elite. On the other hand, the government still has to face the 
pressure of increasing export quality. There are possible ways that the government can make 
export restrictions a better policy to foster the adoption of innovations. If the objective of 
export restrictions is to retain the leading roles of SOEs in the export market, the policy should 
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be adjusted so that these SOEs have incentives to increase the competitiveness of rice exports 
from Vietnam.  
 
If government policy were designed appropriately, the adoption of innovations should be an 
essential condition to provide and maintain food company export rights in the export market. 
In particular, monopoly rights should be withdrawn when the SOEs are not able to commit 
themselves to specified innovation objectives. From the analysis presented in the paper, 
fostering exporter self-production might be suggestive to increase their innovation incentives 
under export restrictions. This condition could prevent firm 1 from only buying from other 
firms and neglecting innovation activities. In general, more innovative policies and political 
innovations would seem to be required in order to manage the practice of providing rents 
effectively. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1  Free Trade Equilibrium 
 
Given: 
 
 
 
with i = 2, 3, ..., N, 
 
the first-order conditions (FOC) of   and πiFT  with respect to q1 and qi, are: 
 
= 0 
= 0 
 
The equilibria    and  qiFT  are: 
 
 , with i = 2, 3, ..., N. 
 
The total quantity and price level are: 
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The free trade profit function of firm 1 is: 
 
 
 
 
Simplifying the equation: 
 
 
 
the first-order condition with respect to a is: 
 
 
 
 
A.2  Trade Restrictions Equilibrium  
 
Given: 
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The FOC of   and πiTR  with respect to q1 and qi are: 
 
− q1 + 1 − q1 − (N − 1)qi − 2(1 − a)kq1 − (N − 1)qi = 0 
 
− (N − 1)q1 − (N − 1)2qi + [1 − q1 − (N − 1)q1](N − 1) − (N − 1)qi = 0 
 
The equilibria for q1 and qi are: 
 
 
 
The total quantity and the price level are: 
 
 
 
 
The trade restriction profit function of firm 1 is: 
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Simplifying the equation: 
 
 
 
the FOC with respect to a is: 
 
 
 
A.3     Monopoly Effect Equilibrium  
 
 
               QTR < QFT 
 
 
we have:  
 
 
      1  
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when N  ≥ 3, and:  
 
 
  
 
Therefore, the original inequality holds when N  ≥ 3. 
 
A.4 Condition that    holds (when there is no innovation) 
 
 
 
 
A.5     Equilibrium profits without innovation 
 
π1FT = (1 − Q)q1 − q12 πiFT = 
(1 − Q)qi − mpqi2 
 
π1TR = (1 − Q)q1 − q12 + (1 − Q)(N − 1)qi − mp(N − 1)qi2 
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Optimal quantities: 
 
 
 
Equilibrium profits: 
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